Dans cet article, j'avance que les lois et les politiques publiques ont une influence importante sur le dével-oppement coopératif, puisqu'elles peuvent contribuer autant à soutenir qu'à freiner ce développement. Dans la littérature, on traite souvent de façon distincte certains facteurs qui -sur les plans financier et technique, et en matière de structures -ont une influence sur le développement coopératif, et l'on ne met suffisamment d'accent sur l'importance du rôle des lois et des politiques dans la mise en place des mécanismes nécessaires au développement coopératif. Je soutiens donc que les facteurs mentionnés ci-dessus sont pertinents, mais également: premièrement, que quand on ne les intègre pas dans une stratégie politique globale, ils ne rendent compte que d'une partie du phénomène du développement coopératif ; et, deuxièmement, que des politiques appropriées sont un excellent outil pour mettre en place essentiels les mécanismes essentiels à un développement coopératif efficace. En tirant des leçons d'expériences coopératives réalisées au Canada et ailleurs dans le monde, cet article propose donc des moyens de créer des politiques et des mécanismes qui pourraient bénéficier au secteur de l'économie sociale au Canada.
introduction
The central topic of this paper is co-operative development factors, with special emphasis on public policy and legislation, which has been a deeply under-researched area (Fairbairn 2004) . In fact, the US Overseas Cooperative Development Council (OCDC) found that resources to fund research on co-operative development are very scarce, as this topic "tends to be a secondary area of emphasis," limiting the impact and results of co-operative development (OCDC 2007, 34) . Therefore, more investigation on co-operative development successes and barriers is necessary.
Co-operative development can be taken as "the increase in their number and the growth and social development of individual co-operative enterprises" (Cornforth and Thomas 1990, 451) . This refers to an actual growth in number and size of enterprises. Understanding the cultural and political components of co-operative movements is an important part of the development process as well; however, this paper does not concentrate on those topics due to space limitations.
Co-operative development is often pursued by three lead actors: government agencies, co-operatives, and individual co-operative developers. Although these three are helpful in facilitating the development process, co-operatives engaging in developing other co-operatives might be a more appropriate model, as established co-operatives have gone through the process themselves; can provide first-hand technical assistance, support, in some cases even financing; and offer a sense of belonging to a movement (Pollet and Develtere 2004) . In the Spanish, Italian, and Quebec examples, co-operative development was pursued by federations of co-operatives, and co-operative groups or alliances, initially with little or no state support, yet proved highly successful in producing an enabling environment for co-operative development. Besides those examples, some relevant aspects of the Manitoba co-operative experience are also brought into this paper as an anglophone example in the comparison of the Canadian co-operative movement.
The literature and empirical research are mostly in agreement on the barriers and constraints co-operatives face, including: a lack of adequate policies and legislation that ensure an equal playing field for co-operatives; a dearth of adequate funding suitable to the needs of cooperatives; a lack of knowledge of the co-operative model and specific managerial and entrepreneurial skills; an absence or weakness of co-operative support organizations; and a lack of coordinated efforts from the sector to lobby governments (CCA 2007; Cornforth and Thomas 1990; Fairbairn et al. 1993; Pollet and Develtere 2004) . Further investigation of those barriers would result in a better understanding of the supportive environment required for co-operative development.
By studying some of the co-operative development supports and barriers, this paper aims to shed light on new policy development strategies for the Canadian social economy. Empirical research and theoretical literature place strong emphasis on the claim that a healthy co-operative sector will be unlikely to develop or even to be effectively maintained unless it has its own supportive organizational infrastructure (Cornforth 1988; Cornforth and Thomas 1990; Fairbairn et al. 1993; Harris et al. 1998; Harris, Stefanson, and Fulton 1996; Morrison 1991; Whyte and Whyte 1991) . Along those lines, Fairbairn et al. stressed the existence of a "gap, generally, in the infrastructure to serve new co-operatives" in Canada that has not been fully addressed in the last two decades (1993, 6) .
The next section discusses public policy and legislation as important tools to create the mechanisms that promote co-operative development, and also some co-operative sector infrastructure crucial for co-operative development. The third section looks at the Manitoba co-operative development initiatives, and the fourth offers concluding insights.
Public Policy and legislation: instruments for co-operative development
This paper pays special attention to public policy development as an instrument for co-operative growth. Torjman (2005) defines "substantive" policy as the one "concerned with the legislation, programs and practices that govern the substantive aspects of community work" (italics in original) (2005, 2) . Policy is a "decision" resulting in an action or plan that pursues "a desired goal" that will benefit all or some groups in society (2005, 4) . Policy assigns value to a goal considered deserving by policy-makers (2005) . Following Karl Polanyi's (1957) framework, economic rationality is embedded and subordinated to the social relations within which it rests. Along those lines, policy is an action or plan resulting from the social, economic, and cultural processes within which social actors or policymakers participate, both shaping the processes and being shaped by them.
The relevance of policy as a key instrument to stimulate or stifle co-operative development has been highlighted by the literature. A recent OCDC report stated: "one of the greatest challenges to successful cooperative development is creating an enabling legal and regulatory environmentadequate laws, regulations and supportive institutions that promote cooperatives as private sector businesses" (2007, 24) . For that reason, this paper emphasizes the need for research in that area. Loxley and Simpson (2007) highlighted the need for favourable policies and legislation that can support co-operative development in Canada. Government commitment toward enabling the creation of that supportive environment, as well as the involvement of the co-operative leaders in the process of lobbying and co-construction of policy, have been deemed important in building a better future for the cooperative movement (Axworthy and Perry 1988; Fairbairn et al.1993; Harris et al. 1998; Laycock 1987; Loxley and Simpson 2007; Vaillancourt 2008) . Actually, public policy and legislation can create a supportive environment for co-operative development that addresses obstacles and sets in motion the supports and infrastructure necessary for co-operative growth. For instance, public policy can be used as a mechanism to create new legal models, favourable taxation, government programming, funding instruments, and the co-operative support organizations necessary for development and innovation.
Further, significant concerns of the Canadian cooperative sector are: "uncertainty of government programs, inappropriate government legislation, complexity of programs, a planning process not sympathetic to co-operatives, and inequitable treatment compared to corporate forms" (Axworthy and Perry 1988; CCA 2007; Fairbairn et al. 1993, 24) . However, little research has been done to explore the subject. Comparing co-operative development policy and legislation can help us devise innovative frameworks for the Canadian co-operative sector.
Mondragon Development Policy and the Spanish Context
After the Spanish Civil War , Spain faced a deep socio-economic crisis. Inspired by Catholic Social Thought, a priest by the name of Jose Maria Arizmendiarrieta, started a vocational school in the Basque region, responding to employment barriers for local workers as well as a need for secondary education. In 1956, five graduates founded the first worker co-operative in Mondragon and called it ULGOR, with 24 workers manufacturing oil stoves and paraffin heaters (MacLeod 1997) . By 1959 (three years later), ULGOR had 170 worker-owners, and new worker co-operatives were being created in the industrial sector. Today, the Mondragon Corporacion Cooperativa (MCC) or the Mondragon Group is a third-tier co-operative business group made up of 281 companies (mostly co-operatives) organized into sectors: financial, industrial, distribution, and research and training. The sectoral groups are independent entities, yet they function within a comprehensive strategy coordinated by the MCC. In 2011, the group consisted of 83,569 worker-owners; 43.6 percent of the workforce were women; total assets were 32.4 billion euros; and total revenue was 14.83 billion euros (MCC 2011). Both Father Arizmendiarrieta's guiding philosophy of social transformation through sovereignty of labour over capital, and his concept of a democratically structured business shaped his new business model (Lutz 1997; Clark 2004) . Since the beginning, the Mondragon co-operatives' raison d'être has been the creation and expansion of co-operatives to provide employment to the region, and contribute to social reformation through this growth (Morrison 1991) . Consequently, Mondragon's most significant internal policy has been the assertive and steady co-operative development strategy they embarked on.
The Mondragon co-operatives developed under the Co-operative Law of 1942, which did not include a provision for worker co-operatives to exist. As is now clear, this law was not adequate for the co-operative model because it placed co-operatives under the control of the military dictatorship the country had lived with since the end of the civil war (Atienza Mazias, Merino Mar, and Ruiz de Huydobro 2004) . According to Aymerich Cruells (2008) , this law did not have the intention of supporting the spread and development of the co-operative movement, but rather controlled the co-operatives as ideologically dangerous organizations capable of awakening a democratic consciousness opposed to the interests of the military regime. In fact, Father Arizmendiarrieta had to convince the public administration that the enterprise the co-operators were trying to create did not jeopardize General Franco's regime (Mathews 1999) . In Mondragon, co-operative development was not a consequence of favourable policies that supported the growth of the sector; rather social groups had to come together and put pressure on individuals and institutions to make the legal changes necessary for a worker co-operative to exist in the first place. In this sense, Mondragon is an example of organizational and legal innovation that paved the way for further co-operative development.
Once the public administration allowed the incorporation of worker co-operatives, more enterprises were created. In 1959, Father Arizmendiarrieta devised the concept of a credit union as a support organization for the expanding co-operatives, where Mondragon residents would deposit their savings, which would, in turn, be invested in local co-operatives (Cheney 1999) . The credit union known as Caja Laboral Popular (CLP) provided financial and technical assistance for the creation of new co-operatives, as well as funds for a co-operative social security system (Cheney1999; Whyte and Whyte 1991) . Between 1961 and 1976, the Bank assisted an average of four to five start-ups per year (Cheney 1999) . In 2011, CLP had 20.84 billion euros in assets and ranked among the largest financial institutions in Spain (MCC 2011).
As a way to grow the asset base of the co-operatives, and at the same time, build assets for the worker-owners, Father Arizmendiarrieta devised the Individualized Capital Accounts (ICAs). When they join the co-operative, each new member contributes a "threshold payment" ($12,000 in 1997) that is deposited in his or her own personal account and adjusted upwards for inflation each year, as well as grown by an average yearly interest rate of about 6 percent (Lutz 1997, 5) . Of the threshold payment, 15-25 percent is a non-refundable contribution to the co-operative's indivisible reserves. New members who cannot afford the threshold payment up front can pay it through a salary deduction plan over a three-year period (Lutz 1997, 5) . As well, each year a significant portion of the co-operative's net surplus is allocated to the ICAs in proportion to the hours worked of each worker-owner. The ICA remains in the co-operative until the member retires or leaves the business.
During their initial years, the Mondragon co-operatives benefitted from support entities created by themselves and based on the underpinning philosophy of starting their own support organizations as needs and opportunities arose (MCC 2011) . Some of these entities include:
• Caja Laboral (Credit Union); • Caja Laboral's Business Division that provided technical assistance, management advice, and animated the creation of new co-operatives; replaced by LKS Consulting in 1980s;
• Saiolan, a business incubator centre to support co-operative start-ups, sector diversity through innovation, and innovative production processes; • Mondragon University and vocational training centres for training qualified staff; • Garaia, a research and development centre in sectors like energy, construction technology, business management, micro-electronics, telecommunications, and nanotechnology; and • Ikerlan, a research and development centre for new products, productions processes, energy efficiency, and renewable energy. (MCC 2011) Besides the Mondragon co-operatives' internal policy innovation, the first significant policy for co-operatives in Spain was the recognition in the Spanish Constitution of 1978 of the value of such organizations. As Article 129.2 expresses: "The public authorities shall effectively promote the various forms of participation in enterprise and facilitate co-operative enterprises by means of appropriate legislation. They shall also establish the means that will facilitate access by the workers to ownership of the means of production" (Government of Spain 1978) . This article is partly the consequence of a long educational process of social actors around the socio-economic value of cooperatives for society. The wording of the constitutional article underlines the value the policy-maker assigns to co-operatives as deserving of institutional support.
That constitutional norm set the ground for building the rest of the legislation and policies to regulate co-operatives. Co-operatives in Spain receive substantial corporate tax advantages at the federal and provincial levels when compared with privately owned firms. The Federal Cooperatives Tax Act (Government of Spain 1990) establishes that worker co-operatives, agricultural co-operatives, community exploitation of land co-operatives, fishery co-operatives, and consumer co-operatives are considered "specially protected co-operatives," or "fiscally protected co-operatives" in the Basque Co-operatives Tax Act (Government of Spain 1997) language. The corporate income tax rate is 10 percent of the profits (Articles 2 and 34; 27). Federally and provincially all co-operatives, except credit unions, housing co-operatives, insurance co-operatives, service co-operatives, school co-operatives, transport co-operatives, and health co-operatives, are considered specially protected organizations for tax purposes. In turn, investor-owned firms' tax rate is about 28 percent. This tax advantage is one of the key policies that enable the development of the co-operative sector.
The Federal Co-operatives Act creates the indivisible reserves or reserve fund, and the education and promotion fund of the co-operative. "The mandatory reserve fund intended for consolidation, development and guarantee of the co-operative, is indivisible between members" (Article 55). Article 58 establishes that a minimum of 20 percent of the profits of the co-operative must be assigned to the indivisible reserves if the profits are a result of business with its own members, or 50 percent of the profits if they are a result of business with non-members. This reserve fund can be leveraged for loans and can cover losses of the co-operative. The spirit of the law has been to capitalize cooperatives and aid their financial stability-attempting to correct the obstacles co-operatives suffer to attract capital, obstacles that are not present for investor-owned firms.
The co-operative education and promotion fund is established in Article 56 of the Federal Co-operative Act 27/1999:
The co-operative education and promotion fund will be allocated [...] to activities that meet one of the following purposes: a) training and education of their members and workers in co-operative principles and values, or specific areas of corporate activity or employment and other co-operative activities; b) the diffusion of co-operatives, and promotion of inter-co-operative relations; and c) promoting cultural, professional and caring local environment or community in general and improving the quality of life and community development and environmental protection actions. (Government of Spain 1999)
The education and promotion fund is non-seizable and indivisible between members. The fund is audited every two years to ensure that co-operatives comply with this law. Should they fail to do so, they will face fines in the amount of their shortfall, the amount will become public debt, and the co-operative will risk losing its co-operative status. Article 58 establishes that the minimum contribution to the education and promotion fund is 5 percent of the profits, whereas the Basque Co-operatives Act 4/1993 increases the mandatory contribution to 10 percent of the profits in Article 67.2.a. The Basque law emphasizes the role co-operatives play in community economic development, and for that reason, it mandates a higher percentage than the federal norm.
According to the Basque Co-operatives Act 4/1993, if a co-operative dissolves, after covering the losses and debts, the remaining indivisible reserves, and the education and promotion fund must go to the Executive Council of Co-operatives for co-operative development (Article 94.2). In the case of the Federal Co-operatives Act 27/1999, Article 75.2 explains that those two amounts will be made available first to the co-operative federation that the co-operative is associated with, then to the National Confederation of Co-operatives, and in the absence of the Confederation, the amounts shall be paid to general government revenue for the promotion of co-operatives. The policy-maker understood that the reason for this provision is the public purpose of a co-operative.
Procurement Policy: Article 138 of the Basque Co-operatives Act 4/1993 details special support and procurement measures for co-operatives: "The worker co-operatives and the second or further tiers of worker co-operatives will have preferential right in cases of tie bids for the tenders and auctions in which they participate and which are called by the Basque public administrations and entities subject to them to carry out works, services and supplies" (Government of Spain 1993). Housing co-operatives in the fulfillment of their purposes may acquire public land by a direct allocation system from public administrations (Art.138.7). These legal provisions especially benefit the Mondragon co-operatives.
Public policy and legislation play a critical role in strengthening co-operatives, since between the lower corporation tax rate and the retention of surplus in both the indivisible reserves and the ICAs (in the Mondragon Group case), the co-operative retains 80 percent of its annual profits as assets, significantly enhancing their sustainability (Lutz 1997; Whyte and Whyte 1991) .
Italian Co-operative Development Policy
The Emilia-Romagna region of Italy is another case of remarkable co-operative development. Once devastated by the Second World War, Emilia-Romagna ranked twelfth among 171 European regions in terms of per capita income in 1996 (Mazzonis 1996) . Emilia-Romagna, with a population of four million inhabitants, boasts 8,000 co-operatives, representing 40 percent of the region's gross domestic product (Restakis 2010, 56) , while Italy as a whole has over 110,000 co-operatives (Borzaga, Depedri, and Bodini 2010) . In general, Italy has been characterized by widespread entrepreneurship spawning small-and medium-sized enterprises that are crucial for the economic development of the country (Zamagni 2000) . Much of the high quality of life and the economic profile of Emilia-Romagna's region are due to a significant "co-operative entrepreneurialism" (Restakis 2010, 86) .
The Italian Constitution of 1947 expressly recognizes the value of co-operatives (as does the Spanish Constitution). Article 45 of the Italian Constitution reads: "The Republic recognises the social function of co-operation of a mutually supportive, non-speculative nature. The law promotes and encourages co-operation through appropriate means and ensures its character and purposes through appropriate checks" (Government of Italy 1947). The policy-maker understood the public purpose of the co-operative model and its importance for community economic development, giving it special institutional support. Also, this recognition is partly due to the socioeconomic role co-operatives have played in Italy since the late 1800s, and also to the support of political parties who shared the co-operative ideology (ICA 2005) . In the beginning (late 1800s), policy was not on the side of the co-operatives; rather the co-operative sector had to create the conditions for co-operatives to prosper, as in the case of Mondragon. Favourable policy development came after the co-operative system had achieved a considerable place in the economy, but it also played a role in further co-operative development.
Italian legislation also created the indivisible reserves, and preferential co-operative taxation mechanisms, as did the Spanish legislation. As per the Basevi Law, passed in 1947, co-operatives were allowed to assign all of their surpluses to the indivisible reserves in a tax-exempt fashion until 2003 (Forte and Mantovani 2009 ). This policy provided co-operatives with main sources of capital that contributed significantly to the development of the movement (Forte and Mantovani 2009; Zamagni and Zamagni 2010) . In comparison, the corporate income tax rate in Italy is 33 percent for privately owned businesses (Thompson 2005) . In 2003, the Berlusconi government decreased the tax advantage for co-operatives to a 70 percent exemption for those co-operatives that do more than half of their business with their members, and to a 30 percent exemption for those that do less than half with their members (Logue 2006) .
The Marcora Act, passed in 1985, was intended to support job creation through the worker-owner co-operative model. This act created a fund designed to assist in the development of new co-operatives, particularly co-operatives created by workers facing job loss (Chaves 2008; Logue 2006) .
Law 59, passed in 1992, provided the co-operative movement with another important policy mechanism to support co-operative development-a solidarity fund (Chaves 2008) . Every co-operative has to invest a mandatory tax-exempt contribution of 3 percent of its annual surplus in this fund, with the purpose of supporting cooperative start-ups and expansions (Zamagni and Zamagni 2010) . The federations manage co-op development funds that offer below-market rate loans to finance new co-operative start-ups, co-operative conversions, and co-operative expansion. Fondo Promozione Cooperative (COOPFOND) is an example of a national fund managed by second-tier co-operative associations (Logue 2006) . As of 2004, COOPFOND had over "240 million euros" (ICA 2005) .
Co-operative federations in Italy play a significant role in the development of the co-operative sector. Three main co-operative federations: Confederazione Cooperative Italiane (CCI), Lega Nazionale delle Cooperative e Mutue, and Associazione Generale, have each set up its own financial institutions, insurance companies, as well as training, research, and development centres. The federations also provide services to their members, such as market feasibility studies, payroll and legal services, workplace safety training, skills development, tax preparation, and collective bargaining (Logue 2006) .
In the 1970s, the Emilia-Romagna government supported co-operative development through the establishment of regional agencies for economic development. These agencies, called ERVET, provide shared services in "research and development, education and training, workplace safety, technology transfer, marketing and distribution, and exporting," among others (Logue 2006, 4) . The centres followed the cooperative model structure and blended government funds, membership fees, and directors elected by the firms that use their services (Restakis 2010) . The agencies look to support and establish business clusters, with a focus on co-operatives as a way of combining the "economies of scale with the advantages and flexibility of small business" in the so-called flexible manufacturing of the region (Logue 2006, 3) , which involves small businesses in the same industry co-operating in joint bids for large contracts (Mazzonis 1996) . In this way, small-and medium-sized co-operatives can reach economies of scale and access major contracts.
Quebec Co-operative Development Policy
Quebec's co-operative sector has been able to draw partnerships among the existing co-operatives through their federations and with the government of Quebec, agreements that have significantly influenced the emergence of co-operatives and strength of the sector (Labelle 1999 ). The Conseil de la coopération du Québec or Co-operative Council of Quebec (CCQ), the provincial umbrella association representing co-operatives, and its 40 co-operative federations act as political advocates for the creation of favourable conditions for the co-operative sector (Labelle 1999) .
The presence of credit unions has been an important factor in the strength of the co-operative sector in Quebec. Alphonse Desjardins is recognized as the 19th century visionary who created the first Canadian credit union in Levis in 1900 and inspired the development of credit unions in North America, in order to provide access to credit for people excluded from the banking system (Poulin 2000) . Today, the Desjardins movement counts almost 5.5 million members in Quebec, and is the largest private employer in the province, with close to 40,000 employees. Along with the credit unions, there are many non-financial co-operatives present in various sectors of the economy, including agriculture, retail, forestry, housing, funeral services, child care, and health care (Diamantopoulos 2011) . Non-financial co-operatives have more than 35,000 employees, nearly 900,000 members, and over $3 billion in assets (Government of Quebec 2003, 16; Labelle 1999 ).
Another key piece of supportive infrastructure in Quebec was the creation of Le Chantier de l'économie sociale, whose role in promoting co-operatives, social enterprises, and community economic development organizations has been relevant in the last two decades. Le Chantier gained influence during the deep economic recession in the mid-1990s as women's organizations, trade unions, anti-poverty groups, and the social economy sector got together to demand from government a real investment in social infrastructure, policies, and funding to promote social enterprises, changes in co-operative legislation, and employment creation (Cote 2007; Neamtan 2002, as cited in Loxley and Simpson 2007) . The ultimate result was a strong and influential social economy sector that included government funding for operations, as well as government-seeded investment funds controlled by the sector for long-term investment, providing continuity to co-operatives and social economy organizations (Loxley and Simpson 2007) .
Co-operative development in Quebec has been particularly dynamic in the last 20 years, in part due to legislative changes that created two innovations on the traditional co-operative model-the solidarity co-operative and the worker-shareholder co-operative (Cote 2007) . The solidarity co-operative, also known as a multi-stakeholder co-operative, is a hybrid model allowing for the expansion of the types of membership in one co-operative to three: consumers, workers, and solidarity members (usually local organizations) (Labelle 1999) . It is a versatile model that can be adapted to all sectors of the economy and enables access to additional capital and expertise through the support members, currently making this one of the more used models for new co-operative start-ups in Quebec (Cote 2007) .
The worker-shareholder co-operative model allows workers to collectively purchase shares in the private company they work for, creating a co-operative with its workers. This new co-operative holds "stock voting rights according to its share of ownership" (Labelle 1999, 2) . The co-operative's votes in the private company are determined by the worker-members, based on the onemember-one-vote formula. The worker-shareholder co-operative acquires a portion of corporate profits and is able to participate in the company's decision-making. This model also enables the company to acquire expansion capital, facilitate corporation restructuring, and enhance personnel retention.
In an effort to encourage further investment in cooperatives, the government of Quebec established Le Régime d'investissement coopératif or System Cooperative Investment Tax Incentive (SCI). This tax incentive provides members and workers with a personal income tax deduction of up to 150 percent of any capital invested in the co-operative (Labelle 1999) . Between its creation in 1985, and 1999, the SCI enabled the investment of "$170 million in producer and worker cooperatives," and as an example, forestry co-operatives doubled their investments from 1996 to 1997 thanks to this tax incentive (Labelle 1999, 4) .
And in an even more direct action toward the support of co-operatives, the provincial government of Quebec also created Investment Quebec as a government corporation that established, among other initiatives, a $140 million fund to provide loans to co-operatives. This co-operative development fund enjoys the reputation of being highly productive and "having the lowest losses" in comparison to other funds in Quebec (Labelle 1999, 3) .
Co-operatives de developpement regional or Regional Development Co-operatives (RDCs) are second-tier cooperative organizations, whose mandate is to support the creation of new co-operatives, strengthen existing ones, and organize a co-operative network in each region (Cote 2007; Diamantopoulos 2011) . RDCs are funded primarily by the government of Quebec's Co-operative Development Assistance Program at the Ministry for Economic Development, Innovation, and Export (Savard 2007) . The Ministry provides RDCs with $3 million annually to manage and allocate in order to support co-operative development (Savard 2007) .
As well, the Government of Quebec launched a cooperative development policy with four major areas of action:
• introduce an effective and innovative legal framework; • develop or improve capitalization and financing tools suitable for the co-operative environment; • improve consulting services available to co-operatives; and • acknowledge the role of the co-operatives by integrating and harmonizing government action in the area of co-operative development. (2003, 9) Labelle states that the reasons for the number (over 3,000) and vitality of the Quebec co-operatives are the "strong organizational support from established cooperatives and the federations they have created, along with the support and partnership of the Quebec government" (1999, 4) .
Much of the public policy and legislation seen in the previous section has been responsible for creating the necessary co-operative support organizations that successfully aid the co-operative development process. Without specific policy and legislation, co-operative support organizations would not easily emerge and consequently give responses to co-operative development issues and barriers.
co-operative development Policy in Manitoba
In the comparison of Canadian provinces, the Manitoba co-operative experience is brought into this paper as an anglophone example to highlight the diversity of the Canadian co-operative development. In Manitoba, policy development and (consequently) supportive infrastructure are not well developed, resulting in a poor sector cohesiveness and strength. Loxley and Simpson argued that "the policy environment in Manitoba appears to be much less enabling for co-ops than in Quebec, which, as a result, has a much larger scale of co-operative operations" (2007, 37) . The number of co-operatives in Manitoba is not even really known, although estimates suggest that there are over 410 co-operatives, credit unions, and caisse populaires with a membership of 800,000, and about $10 billion in assets (CCA 2008) . Co-operatives are organized under the Manitoba Co-operative Association (MCA), although only about 150 participate as members (MCA 2010) . With only three staff, MCA remains under-resourced to create the supportive environment that the Mondragon Group or the Italian and Quebec federations have produced.
The Manitoba provincial government has developed a Community Economic Development (CED) policy framework that is intended to act as a lens for the government in its departments, programming, and policy development (Bernas and Reimer 2012) . While it would seem to be a foundational policy from which support for co-operative development would naturally emerge, MacKinnon argues that this interdepartmental policy means that "CED has become the interest of everyone, but the responsibility of no one. There is no single champion and no real budget" because there are no enforcing mechanisms in place (MacKinnon, as cited in Loxley and Simpson 2007, 33) .
The Canadian tax system does not distinguish between co-operatives and other corporations, resulting in identical corporate income tax rates (Holland 1981) . For instance, the Manitoba tax structure for personal and corporate income does not provide any comparative advantage toward co-operatives, although they benefit as the provincial government eliminated the corporate income tax for small-to medium-sized businesses in 2010 (Manitoba Finance 2007).
Co-operatives can benefit from the Manitoba Community Enterprise Development Tax Credit Program. Launched in 2004, the program is a tool for communitybased enterprises to raise equity capital. Individual investors in co-operatives and community-based enterprises receive a 30 percent personal income tax credit through this program (Manitoba Community Enterprise Development Program 2006). However, Loxley and Simpson (2007) argue that the CED Tax Credit has not been used to its full potential, perhaps due to the relative shortage of demand for the program.
In the summer of 2008, Manitoba Agriculture, Food, and Rural Initiatives (responsible at the time for cooperative services) went through an engagement and visioning process with the co-operative community that led to a co-operative development strategy with three main objectives:
• creating a more supportive environment for the establishment and ongoing operation of co-operatives; • fostering better awareness and understanding of the nature and value of co-operatives; and • providing better infrastructure supports and services for co-operatives. (MHCD 2008, 4) This visioning strategy led to the new Co-operative Development Tax Credit, included in the March 2010 Provincial Budget (Manitoba Finance 2010). The tax credit was the result of a co-construction of policy between the co-operative sector and the provincial government. The goal of this tax credit is to grow the co-operative sector in the province through the provision of technical assistance, the co-ordination of existing services, and the provision of small grants (MCA 2010). Every co-operative can make voluntary financial contributions to a fund managed by the Manitoba Co-operative Association for the purposes described. These contributions receive a staggered tax credit as follows:
• contributions of $0 to $1,000: 75 percent refundable tax credit; • contributions of $1,000 to $10,000: 75 percent nonrefundable tax credit; • contributions of $10,000 to $30,000: 50 percent nonrefundable tax credit; and • contributions of $30,000 to $50,000: 33.3 percent nonrefundable tax credit. (MCA 2010, 1) The design of the co-operative development tax credit follows the mandatory contributions of Italian co-operatives to their federations for co-operative development services, and the Spanish contributions to the co-operative education and promotion fund for similar purposes. By allowing joint contributions from co-operatives and government, this innovative tax credit, unique in Canada, aims to empower the co-operative community and address the lack of resources of the Manitoba Co-operative Association. In the first three months of the program, from October to December 2010, 29 co-operatives and credit unions contributed $72,000 to the fund (Bernas and Reimer 2012) , showing leadership and willingness to contribute to a collective approach for mutual benefit. By the end of 2011, the fund had raised $159,500 to support co-operative development (MCA 2010).
conclusion
The research findings suggest that co-operative development is partially correlated to the nature of the supportive environment, the strength of the sector infrastructure, and government commitment toward enabling the development of this environment and infrastructure through policy, programming, and funding. The role of government appears to be significant in strengthening and providing resources for this infrastructure, either through direct financial contributions or creating policy mechanisms that provide the necessary resources for the federations and associations to play their roles in cooperative development. There seems to be government commitment to co-operatives as a preferred, or at least significant, model of business.
The studied cases seem to point out to the following public policies as mainly responsible for the stimulation of the co-operative movement:
• legal recognition of the socio-economic value cooperatives bring to society; • the legal figure of indivisible reserves (mostly tax exempt) to contribute to capitalization of the business; • lower corporate income tax rates for co-operatives; and • mandatory contributions to a social fund or to cooperative federations to provide services, capital through a fund, and representation to co-operatives.
Despite the fact that policy is tied to socio-cultural, political, and economic factors that depend on local circumstances, similar policies are observed in different settings. The mentioned policies seem to strengthen and capitalize co-operative businesses as they also make possible the existence of co-operative support organizations completing the development cycle. Further research into the socio-cultural and political factors surrounding co-operative development is still required to fully comprehend the co-operative development phenomenon. The considered regions demonstrate significant cooperative infrastructure. Their self-organization into federations, or umbrella associations has been the result of solidarity and vision, and has enabled a more coherent and strategic approach to co-operative development. It should be noted that in the Italian, Spanish, and Quebec examples, co-operative development is not driven by government or individual developers, but has been successfully driven and pursued by co-operative federations or umbrella organizations. The presence of strong federations that provide technical assistance, co-operative development services, and funding for co-operative development is a highly significant component of successful co-operative development as observed in the studied cases.
